European Commission Does Not Recommend Starting Accession Negotiations for Georgia

“Unless Georgia reverts the current course of action which jeopardizes its EU path, and demonstrates tangible efforts to address outstanding concerns and key reforms, the Commission will not be in a position to consider recommending opening negotiations with Georgia,” the report reads.

A year ago, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status, considering that the nine steps outlined in the Commission's recommendation would be implemented. The performance of these nine steps/priorities in the Extension Report is assessed as follows.

Step 1: Fight disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference against the EU and its values. 

During the reporting period, manipulation of EU-related information has been increasing. In particular since the re-introduction of the draft law on transparency of foreign influence in April 2024, harsh anti-EU messages, actively spread by high level ruling party officials and MPs, have become recurrent. In the run-up to Parliamentary elections, disinformation narratives have been disseminated and amplified by i.a. ruling party officials and government-affiliated media.  

Step 2: Improve Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy

In the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), by the end of the reporting period, Georgia’s alignment rate with relevant statements of the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions was persistently low at 49%. Georgia did not join most restrictive measures relating to Russia, Iran and Belarus and further increased direct flights to various destinations in Russia.

During the reporting period, Georgia continued to align itself with international and EU initiatives in support of Ukraine, including on resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Human Rights Council, the Council of Europe and the OSCE.

Step 3: Further address the issue of political polarization

The level of political polarization further deepened, particularly in the run-up to the 2024 parliamentary elections and in the wake of the adoption of the Law on transparency of foreign influence.

Cross-party cooperation on EU integration-related reforms was very limited as most of the relevant legislation was adopted and appointments were made without the opposition’s involvement.

The Parliament did not ensure sufficient involvement of civil society in the legislative processes. Threats from leaders of the parliamentary majority towards opposition members and civil society representatives continued.

During the protests around the law on transparency of foreign influence, several key figures of opposition parties and civil society representatives have been verbally intimidated and physically attacked.

On 23 August, the ruling party announced its plan to ban most of the opposition parties in case of victory in the October’s parliamentary elections.

Relations between the President and the Government have further deteriorated over the reporting period, with the President vetoing a series of laws she assessed contradictory to Georgia’s EU integration and filing a lawsuit at the Constitutional Court against the foreign influence law.

Step 4: Ensure a free, fair and competitive electoral process, notably in 2024, and fully address OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. Finalize electoral reforms.

In March, Parliament adopted amendments to the Election Code disregarding long-standing recommendations of the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR. The amendments foresee the appointment of the CEC Chairperson and CEC non-party members by a simple majority of Parliament members and foresee no effective involvement of other institutions, including the President.

Further amendments to the Electoral Code adopted in May 2024 without prior inclusive consultations with the opposition, abolished the CEC advisory group composed of representatives of the Public Defender and observer organizations. In the same month, Parliament voted to abolish gender quotas on electoral lists, which had been previously extended until 2032.

In August, the CEC adopted a resolution which mandates that the drawing of lots to distribute the functions of commission members at all types of polling stations must be conducted no later than the seventh day before voting, instead of on the day of voting.

In the parliamentary elections held on October 26, the OSCE/ODIHR international observation mission revealed flaws that occurred in a tense and highly polarized environment. Among these flaws were recent electoral legislative changes, frequent violations related to the secrecy of voting, procedural irregularities, and intimidation and pressure on voters, all of which negatively affected public confidence in the process. These preliminary findings confirm the need for comprehensive electoral reform, as discussed in the preliminary recommendations.

Step 5: Further improve the implementation of parliamentary oversight notably of the security services. Ensure institutional independence and impartiality of key institutions.

Quality of oversight over security services remained limited. Investigation into allegations of large-scale illegal wiretapping in 2021 has not, so far, led to any prosecutions.

Electoral amendments adopted in March 2024 reduce the institutional independence of the Central Election Commission.

No actions were undertaken to strengthen the independence of the National Bank and to ensure that all board members are appointed in a transparent and competitive manner. There have been no steps undertaken to appoint a governor since March 2023 and some board positions remain vacant.

Step 6: Complete and implement a holistic and effective judicial reform, including a comprehensive reform of the High Council of Justice and the Prosecutor’s Office.

Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Common Courts, which do not address systemic and substantial recommendations of the 2023 enlargement report and the Venice Commission for a comprehensive reform of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the Supreme Court including a system of extraordinary integrity checks.

In July, the new Prosecutor General was appointed by a simple majority of Parliament. The Tbilisi City Court suspended the President's decision to appoint a new non-judge member of the Supreme Council of Justice and imposed a five-month ban on the appointment of new members.

Moreover, Parliament appointed four Supreme Court judges, despite the legal framework for the selection process not being fully in line with European standards.

Step 7: Further address the effectiveness and ensure the institutional independence and impartiality of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Special Investigative Service and the Personal Data Protection Service. Establish a strong track record in investigating -corruption and organized crime cases. 

Parliament adopted amendments to the law on the fight against corruption, strengthening the immunity of the head of the Anti-Corruption Bureau and enhancing the protection of whistleblowers. However, the current institutional arrangement of the Anti-Corruption Bureau does not provide a sufficient degree of independence. The legislative changes did not address the Venice Commission's key recommendations regarding the institution's independence, political neutrality, and investigative functions in high-level corruption cases.

Additional efforts are needed to tackle high-level corruption.

Parliament also adopted amendments to the laws on the Special Investigative Service and personal data protection. Concerns remain about the appointment and immunity of agency heads, the exclusion of high-ranking officials, the effectiveness of Special Investigation Service investigations, and the expansion of the mandate for secret wiretapping.

Step 8: Improve the current action plan to approach to deoligarchisation

In September 2023, Parliament rejected the de-oligarchization bill, which proposed a "personalized" approach, and the government adopted the de-oligarchization action plan in November 2023. This action plan is based on the previous recommendations of the Venice Commission to follow a "systematic" approach. However, the plan does not include a regular mechanism for consultation with all parliamentary parties and civil society. The distribution of tasks and deadlines remains very broad.

Amendments introduced by Parliament to the Tax Code through accelerated procedures, which permit the tax-free transfer of offshore funds to Georgia, do not align with best international practices.

Step 9: Improving the standards of human rights protection, ensuring the involvement of civil society in the law-making and policy development processes, and guaranteeing their freedom to operate.

The 2023-2030 Human Rights Strategy has not been amended to incorporate the recommendations of the 2023 Enlargement Report. The Action Plan for the Implementation of the Human Rights Strategy 2024-2026 was approved with limited consultation and does not include provisions regarding LGBTQ individuals and privacy protection.

Parliament adopted the Law On Family Values and Protection of Minors without prior public consultations or thorough analysis of its compliance with European and international standards.

The draft constitutional law proposed by the parliamentary majority, On Family Values and Protection of Minors, remains in Parliament. The Venice Commission has deemed it incompatible with European and international standards and recommended that its adoption not proceed.

As a result of legislative activities and the continued spread of homophobic hate speech, LGBTQ individuals in Georgia face an increasingly hostile atmosphere of stigmatization. The investigation into the organization of violence during the 2021 and 2023 Pride events has not yet been completed.

Georgia continues to implement the national action plan to combat domestic violence and violence against women, but gaps remain in addressing the prevention of gender-based violence. The legal definition of rape does not fully meet the standards established by the Istanbul Convention.

Parliament passed the Transparency of Foreign Influence law, despite the Venice Commission recommending that it be repealed entirely.

This law undermines the freedom of association and expression, the right to privacy, the right to participate in public affairs, and the prohibition of discrimination. Onerous reporting requirements and broad powers granted to the Ministry of Justice to oversee civil society organizations and the media increase the risk of selective and arbitrary enforcement.

Acts of intimidation, threats, and physical attacks against civil society activists, political leaders, and journalists have increased, especially in the context of anti-law demonstrations. Most of these incidents are still not properly investigated. The Foreign Influence Transparency Law is expected to further restrict the activities of civil society organizations and reduce their involvement in the legislative and policy-making processes.